Surprise in Elections by Dey, Palash et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
10
11
0v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  3
0 J
an
 20
18
Surprise in Elections
Palash Dey1, Pravesh K. Kothari2, and Swaprava Nath3
1Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, palash.ju.dey@gmail.com
2Princeton University, kothari@cs.princeton.edu
3Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, swaprava@cse.iitk.ac.in
Abstract
Elections involving a very large voter population often lead to outcomes that surprise many.
This is particularly important for the elections in which results affect the economy of a sizable
population. A better prediction of the true outcome helps reduce the surprise and keeps the
voters prepared. This paper starts from the basic observation that individuals in the underlying
population build estimates of the distribution of preferences of the whole population based
on their local neighborhoods. The outcome of the election leads to a surprise if these local
estimates contradict the outcome of the election for some fixed voting rule. To get a quantitative
understanding, we propose a simple mathematical model of the setting where the individuals
in the population and their connections (through geographical proximity, social networks etc.)
are described by a random graph with connection probabilities that are biased based on the
preferences of the individuals. Each individual also has some estimate of the bias in their
connections.
We show that the election outcome leads to a surprise if the discrepancy between the esti-
mated bias and the true bias in the local connections exceeds a certain threshold, and confirm
the phenomenon that surprising outcomes are associated only with closely contested elections.
We compare standard voting rules based on their performance on surprise and show that they
have different behavior for different parts of the population. It also hints at an impossibility
that a single voting rule will be less surprising for all parts of a population. Finally, we exper-
iment with the UK-EU referendum (a.k.a. Brexit) dataset that attest some of our theoretical
predictions.
1 Introduction
Recent times have witnessed quite a few elections whose outcomes are widely considered as sur-
prises. News reports covered the unprecedented impact on trade, national economies, and job
markets because of the results of the elections (e.g., Brexit (News, 2016), US presidential elec-
tions (Independent, 2016), UK parliamentary election (News, 2017b,a) etc.) particularly because
many people and the market were unprepared for such an outcome. It has impacted not only the
economy and made the stock markets unpredictable, the social impact was also paramount. It was
clear that the social connections – either online or offline – and the mass communication media –
print or electronic – that are important factors in opinion building, have a localized effect which
does not give a holistic idea of the outcome of an election. This effect is more prominent in the
online social media, since communities in social media inevitably group similar people together
and it is easy to ignore biases. Having a large number of friends on an online social network may
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solidify the belief that the local observation is quite a representative sample than what actually is
true. This raises a natural question:
“Can the surprise/shock in an election be explained by the social network structure or
the biases in the perception of the voters?”
In this paper, we address this question by proposing a model of the social network formation and
voters’ perception of the winner. We show that the answer cannot be obtained from an analysis that
focuses on only the network structure or only the voter perception. For instance, if we consider
only network structure, the following example shows that any perception about the connection
probability will always leave at least half the population surprised.
Example 1 (Limitation of a structure-based conclusion) Suppose in a population of n
(even) voters with two candidates (red and blue), n/2 are red (meaning they prefer red over blue)
and the rest n/2 are blue. The voting rule is plurality. Suppose the network structure is such that
each voter is connected with every other voter that has the same color as hers, but is connected to
exactly n/2−1 voters of the other color. If she perceives the winner just by counting the majority at
her own neighborhood, then every voter will ‘think’ that her favorite candidate wins, and no matter
how the winning candidate is chosen, half the population will always be surprised at the outcome.
Clearly, the example can be adapted if the voters discount the number of voters of their own color
(given the fact that they are more likely to be connected with a similar colored voter) to yield the
same conclusion. Moreover, if there are more than two candidates, an extension of the construction
above will lead to a surprise of the voters in the classes where the actual winner (in plurality voting
over all voters) is not their favorite candidate.
So, it is clear that a worst case analysis over the social network structure will always lead to surprise
in election – which is hardly the case in practice – elections with unsurprising outcomes are in fact
quite normal. Later in the paper, we discuss how error in voter perception alone also cannot give
rise to surprise. Our approach takes into account both these factors simultaneously and provides
conditions when a typical voter is surprised or not. In fact, there are some counterarguments
claiming that some of these elections cannot be called ‘surprising’ given a correct model of voter
perception (e.g., Economist (2016) for Brexit).
We adopt a Bayesian approach to address the question of surprise that considers the structure
generation and voter perception jointly. We assume a random generative model of the voters and
the social network, and show that an error in estimating the parameters of the generative process
may lead to surprises.
1.1 Our Approach and Results
Let us define the voter generation and social network formation process a bit more formally. Con-
sider a set of m candidates and n voters. A class of a voter is identified by a specific linear order
over the candidates – hence there are m! classes. Each voter is picked i.i.d. from a fixed probability
distribution of belonging to a class. Once the voters are generated, social network among the voters
are formed according to a stochastic block model. This is a general version of an Erdo¨s-Renyi ran-
dom graph model, where the vertices are partitioned into classes and the edge creation probabilities
(which can be different) are defined only among the classes – hence every node of a class connects
to every other node in another class with the same probability. In our model, an intra-class con-
nection probability pii is assumed to be larger than an inter-class connection probability pij (where
2
i and j are indices for classes). For a specific voting rule r, e.g., plurality, and a realization of
the voters denoted by the set V , there is a winner which we represent using wT (V, r). Since every
voting rule we consider are anonymous, i.e., winner does not change even if the voter identities
are changed, the winner is determined just by the number of voters in each class. Therefore, V in
wT (V, r) can be replaced by N = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm!), where Nj is the number of voters in class j.
The perceived winner of voter v is dependent on her estimates of the number of voters in different
classes, denoted by Nˆv := (Nˆv1 , Nˆ
v
2 , . . . , Nˆ
v
m!), and is given by wP (Nˆ
v, r). Voter v is surprised when
wP (Nˆ
v, r) 6= wT ( ~N, r). We call surprise to be the probability of this event. Voter v estimates Nˆvj
by taking the ratio of her observed neighbors of class j with her estimated connection probability
with class j. This estimation neutralizes her observation bias had the estimates been perfect.
With this setup, our first result (Theorem 2) shows that for m = 2, if a ratio of the estimated
connection probabilities stay within a threshold, a voter is not surprised with high probability
(i.e., surprise asymptotically approaching zero as n → ∞). However, if the threshold is crossed,
the voter is surprised w.h.p. A corollary of this result is that if the original distribution of the
voters was very biased towards one class (‘overwhelming majority for one candidate’), then, even
with erroneous connection probability estimates, a voter will never be surprised w.h.p. This result
shows that voters’ perception error is not solely responsible for surprise. Together with Example 1,
we conclude that social connection and voter perception are intertwined reasons for surprise in
elections.
Having observed that surprise is a phenomenon of a closely contested election, we generalize our
results for more than two candidates. As a first approach, we present the case with three candidates
in §4.1. However, the method clearly generalizes with similar assumptions to similar conclusions
with more candidates. Unlike the case with two candidates, for three candidates, one can consider
different voting rules and compare their performances w.r.t. surprise. We consider three prominent
voting rules (that are scoring rules). Our next result (Theorem 4) shows that for different classes
of voters, different rules perform better in terms of surprise – and hints that there may not be a
single surprise-optimal voting rule for all classes of voters. However, we find it interesting that the
performance is not proportional to the distribution of the mass in the scoring rules since in certain
class of the voters, both plurality and veto perform better than Borda voting. All voting rules are
explained when presented.
Though the theoretical results in §4 use the estimates of the connection probabilities and show
that the correctness of those estimates w.r.t. the true values may surprise a voter, we do not
explicitly mention how the voters arrive at these estimates. In §5, we consider a real dataset
(UK-EU referendum, a.k.a. Brexit) and consider a realistic model of network formation and voters’
winner anticipation, that is a realistic instantiation of our theoretical model. We investigate the
effect of intra and inter-class connection probabilities, and the effect of noisy observation of their
estimates on surprise. We find that the conclusions in those results show a resemblance with some of
the theoretical predictions. We present the proofs in an online appendix (?) due to page limitation.
2 Related Work
Public elections and their outcomes had been one of the cornerstones of research in social choice
theory. In the computational social choice and multi-agent systems literature, there had been sev-
eral notions to measure the ‘goodness’ of elections. For example, margin of victory, defined as
the smallest number of voters who can alter the outcome of an election by voting differently (Xia,
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2012; Dey and Narahari, 2015), provides a quantitative threshold of surprising outcomes in terms
of the voter population. A related literature exists for bribery in election (Faliszewski et al., 2006;
Elkind et al., 2009; Mattei et al., 2013; Bredereck et al., 2016, e.g.) and complexity of manipula-
tive attacks (Bartholdi et al., 1989; Conitzer et al., 2007; Faliszewski et al., 2014; Parkes and Xia,
2012, e.g.). Surprise in election, to the best of our knowledge, has not been formally studied in this
literature. There is a relevant body of literature in political economy. Ely et al. (2015) formally
define suspense and surprise in a dynamical model and provide a design approach to maximize
either of them for a Bayesian audience. The motivation for the dynamical model comes from the
examples of mystery novels, political primaries, casinos, game shows, auctions, and sports. Our
definition of surprise (the outcome is contrary to a voter’s belief) is closely related in spirit, and
is adapted to a single-shot decision. In sports tournaments, it is important to design the schedule
so that the games are highly competitive and results are unpredictable (Dagaev and Suzdaltsev,
2015; Olson and Stone, 2014). In fact, information design, where a social planner aims to maxi-
mize the unpredictability of a contest has been investigated in various contexts (see, e.g., a recent
survey by Bergemann and Morris (2017)). But in election outcomes stability is of prime impor-
tance (Pattanaik, 1973; Dummett and Farquharson, 1961; Rubinstein, 1980). The social connec-
tion model in our paper is inspired by stochastic block model. This model has a long tradition of
study in the social sciences and computer science (Karrer and Newman, 2011; Holland et al., 1983;
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Therefore, in this paper, we approach the question of surprise in elec-
tion using well studied models of social connection and surprise, and introduce a voter perception
model to present insightful results.
3 Model
Let [k] , {1, . . . , k}. Let N = [n] be the set of voters, and M = {a1, . . . , am} be the set of
candidates. Every voter has an ordinal preference over the candidates, and we assume that these
preference relations are total orders, i.e., transitive, anti-symmetric, and complete. We assume
m << n, which is representative of real elections. Since the number of preference orders can be
at most m!, we partition the voters into disjoint classes identified by Pk, k ∈ C, with C = [m!]
being the indices of the classes. Voters in a given class share the same preference order. Let
~N := (|Pk|, k ∈ C) denote the vector of the number of voters in each class. With a slight abuse of
notation, we will refer to the preference of the voters in Pk also with the same notation.
Every voter is associated with class Pj with probability ǫj independently from other voters,
where ǫj ∈ [0, 1], ∀j ∈ C, and
∑
j∈C ǫj = 1. We assume that the ǫj’s are unknown to the voters.
The association is represented by the mapping σ : N → C, which maps the voter identities to the
class indices. A random social network is formed with these voters by a stochastic block model
which is represented by a |C| × |C| symmetric matrix P = [pjk], where pjk denotes the connection
probability between the classes of voters Pj and Pk. In this connection model, the probability of
connections for every voter in a class with every voter in another class is identified by a single
parameter, which may change for a different pair of classes. The resulting graph is denoted by
G = (N,E), where E is the edge set. The edge creation process is independent among each other
and also is independent with the voter-to-class association process. We assume a regularity among
the connection probabilities for which we need to define a distance metric.1 The Kendall-Tau (KT)
distance between two preference orderings Pj and Pk is the minimum number of adjacent flip of
1A valid distance metric is one that is (1) non-negative, (2) symmetric, and (3) obeys triangle inequality.
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candidates needed to reach one from the other. Clearly, this is a valid distance metric. We call
the pjk’s regular if they are monotone decreasing with increasing KT distance between Pj and Pk
– which means that the voters with more dissimilar preferences are less likely to be connected.
We assume that a voter knows the preferences of her immediate neighbors (on the social network)
perfectly, but does know the preferences of the other voters.
A voter v ∈ Pj estimates these connection probabilities which are denoted by pˆjk for all k ∈ C.
We assume that the voters’ estimated pˆjk’s are also regular. At this point, we do not assume a
model on how the voters reach their estimates. In §5, we consider a specific model of estimates for
the experiments where voters take weighted average of their own observations and a noisy version
of the true global distribution. The next section deals with how the errors in these estimates can
affect a voters perception of the winner. We will consider only deterministic voting rules.
Voters’ winner perception model: Voter v estimates the number of voters in class Pk by
dividing the number of her own neighbors in that class on G, defined as Nbrkv := {t : (v, t) ∈ E, t ∈
Pk}, with her estimated pˆσ(v)k. Hence voter v’s estimated number of voters in class Pk is,
Nˆkv =
{ 1
pˆσ(v)k
|Nbrkv | if k 6= σ(v),
1
pˆσ(v)σ(v)
|Nbrσ(v)v |+ 1 otherwise,
(1)
Note that if the pˆσ(v)k ’s were accurate, by strong law of large numbers, this estimate gives the right
number of voters in each class asymptotically almost surely.
The voters now have randomly realized preferences and connections with each other. Also,
every voter v has an estimate of the number of voters in different classes, and therefore, under
a given (anonymous) voting rule r, her perceived winner is denoted by wP (Nˆ
v, r), where Nˆv :=
(Nˆv1 , Nˆ
v
2 , . . . , Nˆ
v
|C|). The true winner for the same realization is denoted by wT ( ~N, r). A voter is
surprised when her perceived winner is different from the true winner, defined formally as follows.
Definition 1 (Event of Surprise) An event of surprise of a voter v for a specific realization of
the voter preferences and social graph is the event where the voter’s perceived winner is not the true
winner, i.e., the event Sv such that,
Srv := {wP (Nˆv, r) 6= wT ( ~N, r)}. (2)
We will call the probability of this event as surprise of voter v under voting rule r, denote by
surprv := P (S
r
v).
Note that, the event of surprise is specific to a voter, but every voter in a given class has same
surprise in this model, while voters in different classes may have different surprises for the same
parameters.
Metric to compare voting rules: Let the event of some candidate b (6= wT ( ~N, r)) beating the
true winnerwT ( ~N, r) be defined as Beat
r
v(b, wT (
~N, r)) := {b beats wT ( ~N, r) in r}. The event of sur-
prise, therefore, can be written as Srv = ∪b6=wT ( ~N,r)Beat
r
v(b, wT (
~N, r)). For the chosen parameters,
define the most probable false beating candidate as brv
∗ ∈ argmaxb6=wT ( ~N,r) P (Beat
r
v(b, wT (
~N, r))),
with ties broken arbitrarily. Using the union bound and the fact that the probability of an union
of events is always larger than that of the largest probability of the individual events, we get,
P (Srv) = surp
r
v ∈ [ℓrv, (m− 1)ℓrv ],
where ℓrv = P (Beat
r
v(b
r
v
∗, wT ( ~N, r))).
(3)
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It is enough to analyze the event Beatrv(b
r
v
∗, wT ( ~N, r)) and consider the quantity MPFBrv := ℓrv, which
we will call the most probable false beating (MPFB) factor, to compare between different voting
rules, since surprise can vary at most by a constant factor of this MPFB factor. In the following
sections, we will see that the effect of the number of voters on this factor is in the exponent. Since
the number of voters is large, the conclusions on surprise are entirely dictated by the growth or
decay of the MPFB factor.
4 Theoretical Results
In this section, we first analyze the setting with two candidates to get a better insight. The set of
candidates is M = {a1, a2} and the classes are P1 = a1 ≻ a2 and P2 = a2 ≻ a1. WLOG, we assume
that ǫ1 =
1
2 + ǫ and ǫ2 =
1
2 − ǫ with 0 < ǫ < 1/2. For two candidates, all standard voting rules
yield the same winner as the plurality rule, and therefore, we will be considering only plurality in
the case of two candidates. We first show that candidate a1 emerges as winner in plurality w.h.p.
Theorem 1 When voters fall in class P1 and P2 w.p.
1
2+ǫ and
1
2−ǫ respectively, with 0 < ǫ < 1/2,
P (wT ( ~N, Plu) = a2) 6 e
−√n/2 for sufficiently large n.
Proof : Let Xi denote the number of voters in Pi, i ∈ [2]. Hence
Xi =
∑
v∈N
I{v ∈ Pi}, i ∈ [2].
Define,
Z := X2 −X1 =
∑
v∈N
[I{v ∈ P2} − I{v ∈ P1}] =:
∑
v∈N
Zv.
Where Zv := I{v ∈ P2} − I{v ∈ P1}, v ∈ N are i.i.d. RVs taking values −1 w.p. 12 + ǫ and 1 w.p.
1
2 − ǫ. Clearly, {wT ( ~N, Plu) = a2} =⇒ {Z > 0}. We see that EZ = −2nǫ. Using Hoeffding
bound, we get
Pr(Z − EZ > t) 6 e− t
2
2n .
Pick t = n3/4. Then for n > 1
16ǫ4
, EZ + n3/4 = −2nǫ+ n3/4 6 0. Hence, for n > 1
16ǫ4
, we get
Pr(wT ( ~N, Plu) = a2) 6 Pr(Z > 0) 6 Pr(Z > EZ + n
3/4) 6 e−
√
n
2 .

Since candidate a1 turns out to be the true winner w.h.p., we will consider only the conditional
probability that a2 is the perceived winner given a1 being the true winner, which will approximately
be equal to surprise for large n.
Theorem 2 (Surprise for two candidates) When voters fall in class P1 and P2 w.p.
1
2 + ǫ and
1
2 − ǫ respectively, with 0 < ǫ < 1/2, we have the following.
⊲ For voter v in P1,
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– if pˆ11pˆ12 >
p11
p12
1/2+ǫ
1/2−ǫ , then P (wP (Nˆ
v, Plu) = a2 | wT ( ~N, Plu) = a1) > 1− 2e−2
(
pˆ11pˆ12
pˆ11+pˆ12
)2√
n
for large enough n; hence, surpPluv
n→∞→ 1, i.e., voter v is surprised w.h.p.
– if pˆ11pˆ12 <
p11
p12
1/2+ǫ
1/2−ǫ , then P (wP (Nˆ
v, Plu) = a2 | wT ( ~N, Plu) = a1) 6 e−2
(
pˆ11pˆ12
pˆ11+pˆ12
)2√
n
for
large enough n; hence, surpPluv
n→∞→ 0, i.e., voter v is not surprised w.h.p.
⊲ For voter v in P2,
– if pˆ22pˆ21 <
p22
p21
1/2−ǫ
1/2+ǫ , then P (wP (Nˆ
v, Plu) = a2 | wT ( ~N, Plu) = a1) > 1− 2e−2
(
pˆ22pˆ21
pˆ22+pˆ21
)2√
n
for large enough n; hence, surpPluv
n→∞→ 1, i.e., voter v is surprised w.h.p.
– if pˆ22pˆ21 >
p22
p21
1/2−ǫ
1/2+ǫ , then P (wP (Nˆ
v, Plu) = a2 | wT ( ~N, Plu) = a1) 6 e−2
(
pˆ22pˆ21
pˆ22+pˆ21
)2√
n
for
large enough n; hence, surpPluv
n→∞→ 0, i.e., voter v is not surprised w.h.p.
Proof : We prove the result only for the case when v ∈ P2, since the other case is symmetric.
Define θ = 1/2 + ǫ. Let the random graph formed according to the stochastic model is denoted by
G = (N,E). For i ∈ [2], let Xi be the set of voters denoting the neighbors of v that belong to class
Pi. Hence, v’s estimated number of voters in classes P1 and P2 are
|X1|
pˆ21
and |X2|pˆ22 + 1 respectively.
The additional one voter in the estimate of P2 comes from voter v counting herself. Hence
|X1|
pˆ21
=
1
pˆ21
∑
u∈N
I({(vu) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P1}), (4)
|X2|
pˆ22
=
1
pˆ22
∑
u∈N\{v}
I({(vu) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P2}). (5)
Taking expectations over these quantities, we get,
E
( |X1|
pˆ21
)
=
1
pˆ21
∑
u∈N
P (u ∈ P1) · P ((vu) ∈ E) | u ∈ P1) = n θ p21
pˆ21
and,
E
( |X2|
pˆ22
)
=
1
pˆ22
∑
u∈N\{v}
P (u ∈ P2) · P ((vu) ∈ E) | u ∈ P2) = (n− 1) (1− θ) p22
pˆ22
.
Define a new random variable, Z := |X2|pˆ22 + 1−
|X1|
pˆ21
. Its expectation is
EZ = (n− 1)(1 − θ)p22
pˆ22
+ 1− nθp21
pˆ21
= (n− 1)
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
p22
pˆ22
+ 1− n
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
p21
pˆ21
= n
[((
1
2
− ǫ
)
p22
pˆ22
−
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
p21
pˆ21
)
+
1
n
(
1−
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
p22
pˆ22
)]
. (6)
We first consider the case when pˆ22pˆ21 >
p22
p21
· 1/2−ǫ1/2+ǫ .
The first term in the bracket in Equation (6) is negative since pˆ22pˆ21 >
p22
p21
· 1/2−ǫ1/2+ǫ , by assumption.
Let −ℓ = (12 − ǫ) p22pˆ22 − (12 + ǫ) p21pˆ21 . Hence the whole expression of Equation (6) is negative for
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n > max{0,
(
1− (12 − ǫ) p22pˆ22
)
/ℓ} =: n0. Hence, EZ is negative for sufficiently large n. Note
from Equations (4) and (5) that Z can also be written as the sum over the differences of the
indicator functions. We will use Hoeffding’s bound since the random variables in the sum are
independent. The maximum of every term in that sum of indicators that represent Z can be 1/pˆ22
and the minimum can be −1/pˆ21, hence the maximum difference between each of the summands is
(pˆ22 + pˆ21)/pˆ22pˆ21. We have,
Pr(wP (Nˆ
v, Plu) = a2 | wT ( ~N, Plu) = a1) ≤ Pr(Z − EZ > t) 6 e−2
(
pˆ22pˆ21
pˆ22+pˆ21
)2· t2
n . (7)
Plugging in t = n3/4, we get that the probability of Z > EZ +n3/4 is at most e
−2
(
pˆ22pˆ21
pˆ22+pˆ21
)2√
n
. Let
n1 := inf{n > 0 :
((
1
2 − ǫ
) p22
pˆ22
− (12 + ǫ) p21pˆ21
)
+ 1n
(
1− (12 − ǫ) p22pˆ22
)
+ 1
n1/4
< 0}. The number n1 is
guaranteed to exist since pˆ22pˆ21 >
p22
p21
· 1/2−ǫ1/2+ǫ , by assumption. Therefore for all n > n1, Z is greater
than a negative quantity with probability at most e
−2
(
pˆ22pˆ21
pˆ22+pˆ21
)2√
n
. Since {Z > 0} ⊂ {Z > −ve},
we have that ∀n > n1, Pr(Z > 0) 6 e−2
(
pˆ22pˆ21
pˆ22+pˆ21
)2√
n
.
We now consider the case when pˆ22pˆ21 <
p22
p21
1/2−ǫ
1/2+ǫ . We leverage the calculations we did for the
previous case. Because of the assumption pˆ22pˆ21 <
p22
p21
· 1/2−ǫ1/2+ǫ , EZ is positive for large n (Equation (6)).
Using Equation (7), we have,
Pr(wP (Nˆ
v, Plu) = a2 | wT ( ~N, Plu) = a1) ≤ Pr(|Z − EZ| 6 t) > 1− 2e−2
(
pˆ22pˆ21
pˆ22+pˆ21
)2· t2
n .
This implies that the probability of Z > EZ − t is at least the quantity on the RHS
of the above inequality. Again, plugging in t = n3/4 and defining n2 := inf{n > 0 :((
1
2 − ǫ
) p22
pˆ22
− (12 + ǫ) p21pˆ21
)
+ 1n
(
1− (12 − ǫ) p22pˆ22
)
− 1
n1/4
> 0}, which is guaranteed to exist by
assumption, we get the desired conclusion for all n > n2. This completes the proof. 
Corollaries. Theorem 2 captures the determining factors for surprise in plurality voting. Few
conclusions are in order.
1. If an agent’s estimated pˆ’s were perfect, then the agent is never surprised w.h.p., since then
the ratios will always satisfy the ‘not surprised’ condition of Theorem 2.
2. Surprise may happen when ǫ is small, i.e., the winning margin is small. This is because,
the surprise-determining thresholds for pjj/pjks in Theorem 2 are very close to the actual
ratios pjj/pjks and a small error of the voter in estimating these connection parameters may
lead to surprise. However, when the winning margin is large, e.g., ǫ is large enough such
that p22p21
1/2−ǫ
1/2+ǫ < 1 and if the pˆ’s are also regular, i.e., pˆ22 > pˆ21, then no agent in P2 will be
surprised. This shows that elections with an overwhelming majority can hardly be surprising.
Surprise is a phenomenon only of a closely contested election.
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4.1 Three Candidates
We now consider the problem with three candidates. In this setting, different voting rules give rise
to different winners and therefore it is possible to distinguish them w.r.t. the surprise metric. In this
section, we will compare three voting rules, namely plurality, Borda, and veto (explained below),
based on the factor MPFBrv (Equation (3)) because of the reason explained right after the equation
in §3. A collection of m-dimensional vectors ~sm = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) ∈ Rm with α1 > α2 > · · · > αm
and α1 > αm for every m ∈ N defines a voting rule (called scoring rule) — a candidate receives a
score of αi from a vote if it is placed at the i-th position in that vote, and the score of a candidate
is the sum of the scores it receives from all the votes. The winners are the candidates with the
maximum score. The score vectors for the plurality, Borda, and veto voting rules are (1, 0, . . . , 0),
(m−1,m−2, . . . , 1, 0), and (1, . . . , 1, 0) respectively. Scoring rules remain unchanged if we multiply
every αi by any constant λ > 0 and/or add any constant µ. Hence, we assume without loss of
generality that, for 3 candidates, the Borda score vector is (2/3, 1/3, 0) and the veto score vector is
(1/2, 1/2, 0) to ensure that
∑3
i=1 αi = 1 for all the rules.
We chose these three voting rules because (1) they are most frequently used, and (2) the
distribution of scores in these rules has wide variety – the whole score concentrated at the top
alternative for plurality, (almost) equally distributed for veto, and in between these two extremes
for Borda.
For two candidates, we have seen that surprise occurs only in closely contested elections. Hence
to compare the voting rules in this section, we consider that the voters are uniformly distributed
over the |C| preference classes.
Assumption 1 (Uniform Population) Every voter belongs to exactly one class of preference in
{Pk : k ∈ C} with uniform probability.
We also assume that the voters’ estimates of the connection probabilities are consistently higher
than their true values as the KT distance increases between the preference class of the voter and the
class of her neighbor, i.e., pij/pˆij ’s are decreasing in distKT(Pi, Pj). The motivation is to capture
the fact that people often consider their local neighborhood to be representative of the global
population, leading to an uniform pˆij’s for all i, j ∈ C. Since the true connection probabilities are
regular, i.e., decreasing in distKT(Pi, Pj), it gives rise to a monotone estimation error.
Assumption 2 (Monotone Estimation Error (MEE)) The ratio of the true connection prob-
ability to the estimated one decreases with the KT distance, i.e., pkℓpˆkℓ >
pkp
pˆkp
when distKT(Pk, Pℓ) <
distKT(Pk, Pp) when v ∈ Pk.
In the proof of our main result in this section, we will use a quantitative version of the central
limit theorem due to Berry (1941) and Esseen (1942). The following exposition is from Tao (2010).
Theorem 3 (Berry-Esseen) Let X be a random variable with mean µ, unit variance, and finite
third moment. Let Zn =
∑n
i=1Xi√
n
, where Xi’s are i.i.d. copies of X. Then we have Pr[Zn > λ] =
Pr[G > λ]+O(E|X|3/√n), uniformly for all λ ∈ R, where G ≡ Normal(µ, 1), and the implied constant
in O(·) is absolute and does not depend on the distribution of X.
This theorem gives a quantitative guarantee on the deviation of the cumulative distribution function
of the random variable Zn from that of a normal random variable with mean same as X and unit
variance.
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With the assumptions as mentioned above, we present our main result for three candidates in
the following theorem. Informally, this theorem compares plurality, Borda, and veto voting rules
based on MPFBfactor. Since surprv = Θ(MPFB
r
v) (Equation (3)), we conclude that a lower MPFB
factor gives a lower surprise.
Theorem 4 Consider |M | = 3, and voters are generated from an uniform population. Let v be
any voter.
(i) If v ranks the true winner at the first position, then MPFBPluv 6 MPFB
Bor
v 6 MPFB
Vet
v w.h.p.
(ii) If v ranks the true winner at the second position, then MPFBVetv 6 MPFB
Bor
v 6 MPFB
Plu
v w.h.p.
(iii) If v ranks the true winner at the last position, then MPFBVetv 6 MPFB
Bor
v and MPFB
Plu
v 6 MPFB
Bor
v
w.h.p.
Discussion: This result gives us a fine grained information regarding the performance on surprise
of different voting rules in different voter classes. It is also clear that among these standard voting
rules there is no single rule that reduces surprise for all sections of voters. But we find it interesting
that the performance on surprise is not proportional to the distribution of scores in the rules, since
in case (iii), Borda, that has non-extreme distribution of scores performs worse than both the other
two rules having extreme score distributions.
Brief sketch of the proof: We assume WLOG, that a specific candidate wins w.h.p. We consider
each of the three cases in the theorem separately. For every case, we prove the claim in three stages.
First, we consider the two ‘false beating’ events where the true winner is not the perceived winner
– for which we consider the difference in the overall scores (as we are considering only scoring
rules) of the other two candidates with that of the true winner. Second, to compute the probability
that these two expressions are positive (which implies that these are the false beating events), we
find the mean and variance of these expressions and normalize the difference expression with the
standard deviation so that the Berry-Esseen theorem (Theorem 3) can be invoked. Finally, we find
the maximum of the two probabilities of false-beating events to compute the MPFBrv for that voting
rule. The claim is proved by comparing these MPFB factors.
Proof : LetM = {a1, a2, a3}. We label the classes as shown in Table 1. Each voter belongs to class
Pk w.p. 1/6 in the uniform population model (Assumption 1). WLOG, assume that the candidate
a2 wins the election w.h.p., i.e., the overall score is highest for a2 in every rule, and ties are broken
in favor of a2. Let (s1, s2, 0) be a normalized scoring rule vector with s1 + s2 = 1 and s1, s2 > 0.
Class Preferences Class Preferences
P1: a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3 P4: a2 ≻ a3 ≻ a1
P2: a1 ≻ a3 ≻ a2 P5: a3 ≻ a1 ≻ a2
P3: a2 ≻ a1 ≻ a3 P6: a3 ≻ a2 ≻ a1
Table 1: Preference classes for 3 candidates
Hence, the vector is (1, 0, 0), (2/3, 1/3, 0), and (1/2, 1/2, 0) respectively for Plu, Bor, and Vet. For
a voter v, let sˆv(a1), sˆv(a2), sˆv(a3) be the random variables denoting the estimated scores for the
candidates a1, a2, and a3 perceived by v.
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For every rule r and voter v, we are interested in the differences of these estimated scores, i.e.,
sˆv(aj)− sˆv(a2), j = 1, 3, since a positive value of this expression implies that a false beating event
has occurred. The maximum probability of these two events is MPFBrv.
With the voters’ winner perception model, each of these estimated scores of v can be written as
a sum over the indicator RVs that another voter belong to a specific preference class and they are
connected to v (with appropriate scaling with pˆkl if v ∈ Pk and the other voter is in Pl). Hence, we
can write the difference in the estimated scores as sˆv(a1)− sˆv(a2) =
∑
u∈N\{v}Xu,a1−a2 + δv,a1−a2
and sˆv(a3)− sˆv(a2) =
∑
u∈N\{v}Xu,a3−a2 + δv,a3−a2 , where we clearly distinguish the contribution
of voter v in the differences with the variable δv,aj−a2 , j = 1, 3. We denote the summation on the
RHS in each equality with the shorthand S−v,aj−a2 :=
∑
u∈N\{v}Xu,aj−a2 , j = 1, 3. The expression
Xu,a1−a2 (resp. Xu,a3−a2) is the indicator random variable denoting voter u’s contribution to the
difference in the score of a1 (resp. a3) and a2 if u is connected to v. We detail out the exact
expressions of Xu,aj−a2 when we consider the following cases.
Case 1: v ∈ P1 or v ∈ P6 (i.e., when v ranks the winner at the second position): We
only consider v ∈ P1, since the analysis for v ∈ P6 is symmetric. For v ∈ P1, the expression of
Xu,a1−a2 turns out as follows for u ∈ N \ {v}.
Xu,a1−a2 =
(s1 − s2)
(
1
pˆ11
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P1})− 1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P3})
)
+ s2
(
1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P5})− 1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P6})
)
+ s1
(
1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P2})− 1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P4})
)
.
Note that these are i.i.d. random variables for u ∈ N \{v}, whose mean and variances are as follows.
E[Xu,a1−a2 ] = (s1 − s2)(p11/6pˆ11 − p12/6pˆ12) > 0
We get the equality due to Assumption 1 and the inequality due to Assumption 2. We also have
E[X2u,a1−a2 ] = (s1 − s2)2 (p11/6pˆ211 + p12/6pˆ212) + (s21 + s22)p12/3pˆ212.
Hence
var(Xu,a1−a2) = E[X
2
u,a1−a2 ]− (E[Xu,a1−a2 ])2
= (s1 − s2)2
(
p11
6pˆ211
+
p12
6pˆ212
−
(
p11
6pˆ11
− p12
6pˆ12
)2)
+
p12
3pˆ212
(s21 + s
2
2).
For u ∈ N \ {v}, define the normalized random variable
X¯u,a1−a2 = Xu,a1−a2/
√
var(Xu,a1−a2 ).
Clearly, E[X¯u,a1−a2 ] = E[Xu,a1−a2 ]/
√
var(Xu,a1−a2 ) and var(X¯u,a1−a2) = 1. We can now apply Theo-
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rem 3 for large n to get
Pr[S−v,a1−a2 + δ1,a1−a2 > 0 | v ∈ P1]
= Pr
[
S−v,a1−a2√
nvar(Xu,a1−a2)
+
δ1,a1−a2√
nvar(Xu,a1−a2)
> 0 | v ∈ P1
]
= Pr
[
Gv,a1−a2 > −δ1,a1−a2/
√
nvar(Xu,a1−a2)
]
+O (1/√n)
= Pr[Gv,a1−a2 > 0] +O (1/√n) .
(8)
Where Gv,a1−a2 is a normal RV with mean E[X¯u,a1−a2 ] and unit variance. The last equality follows
from the fact that Pr
[
0 > Gv,a1−a2 > −δ1,a1−a2/
√
nvar(Xu,a1−a2)
]
= O(1/√n) since the length of the
interval
[−δ1,a1−a2/√nvar(Xu,a1−a2), 0] is O(1/√n), hence the integral of any probability distribution
over it is O(1/√n).
Similarly, for u ∈ N \ {v}, Xu,a3−a2 is defined as follows.
Xu,a3−a2 =
(s1 − s2)
(
1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P6})− 1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P4})
)
+ s2
(
1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P2})− 1
pˆ11
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P1})
)
+ s1
(
1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P5})− 1
pˆ12
I({(u, v) ∈ E} ∩ {u ∈ P3})
)
.
Taking expectation, we get
E[Xu,a3−a2 ] = s2(p12/6pˆ12 − p11/6pˆ11) 6 0
The equality follows due to Assumption 1 and the inequality due to Assumption 2. Performing
similar calculation as we did for Xu,a1−a2 , we reach a unit variance normal RV Gv,a3−a2 . However,
the mean of Gv,a1−a2 turns out to be larger than Gv,a3−a2 , which lead to the conclusion that for
large n
Pr[S−v,a1−a2 + δ1,a1−a2 > 0 | v ∈ P1]
> Pr[S−v,a3−a2 + δ1,a3−a2 > 0 | v ∈ P1]
Hence, to find the MPFB factor in this case, we need to compare the probability of Equation (8)
among different voting rules. Since, the probability reduces to the tail distribution of Gv,a1−a2
which is a normal RV with unit variance, it is enough to compare the means of Gv,a1−a2 to compare
the MPFB factors. Denoting the means of Gv,a1−a2 by µrv for voter v under rule r, we get for large
enough n
µVetv 6 µ
Bor
v 6 µ
Plu
v .
Which implies w.h.p.
MPFBVetv 6 MPFB
Bor
v 6 MPFB
Plu
v .
The analysis for v ∈ P6 is the same with the roles of candidates a1 and a3 being reversed.
Hence, we have proved claim (ii) of the theorem.
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Case 2: v ∈ P2 or v ∈ P5 (i.e., when v ranks the winner at the last position): We adopt
a similar calculation as Case 1 to get
E[Xu,a1−a2 ] = s1(p11/6pˆ11 − p12/6pˆ12) > 0
E[X2u,a1−a2 ] = s
2
1(p11/6pˆ
2
11 + p12/6pˆ212) + p12/3pˆ212((s1 − s2)2 + s22)
With notations similar to Case 1, we denote the mean of the normalized variance normal RV
Gv,aj−a2 by µ
r
v,aj−a2 , j = 1, 3, for the differences of estimated scores of voter v between candidates
aj and a2, j = 1, 3. Hence
µrv,aj−a2 = E

 S−v,aj−a2√
nvar(Xu,aj−a2)
| v ∈ P2

 , j = 1, 3.
With similar computations, we get for voter v ∈ P2
max{µPluv,a1−a2 , µPluv,a3−a2} = max{µVetv,a1−a2 , µVetv,a3−a2} 6 max{µBorv,a1−a2 , µBorv,a3−a2}
Which implies w.h.p.
MPFBVetv 6 MPFB
Bor
v and MPFB
Plu
v 6 MPFB
Bor
v .
The case for v ∈ P5 is same with the roles of candidates a1 and a3 reversed. Hence, we have proved
claim (iii) of the theorem.
Case 3: v ∈ P3 or v ∈ P4 (i.e., when v ranks the winner at the first position): With
notations similar to Case 1, and denoting the mean of the normalized variance normal RV Gv,aj−a2
by µrv,aj−a2 , j = 1, 3, for the differences of estimated scores of voter v between candidates aj and
a2, j = 1, 3, we have
µrv,aj−a2 = E

 S−v,aj−a2
n
√
var(Xu,aj−a2)
| v ∈ P3

 , j = 1, 3.
With similar computations, we get for voter v ∈ P3
max{µPluv,a1−a2 , µPluv,a3−a2} 6 max{µVetv,a1−a2 , µVetv,a3−a2} 6 max{µBorv,a1−a2 , µBorv,a3−a2}
Which implies w.h.p.
MPFBPluv 6 MPFB
Bor
v 6 MPFB
Vet
v .
The case for v ∈ P4 is same with the roles of candidates a1 and a3 reversed. Hence, we have proved
claim (i) of the theorem. 
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5 Empirical Results
Our theoretical results in §4 use some simplifying assumptions in the interest of a cleaner analysis.
Firstly, we assumed that the voters have an estimate of the connection probabilities, though we
do not explicitly mention how the voters arrive at these estimates. In practice, voters anticipate a
winner by implicitly estimating the number of voters voting in favor of the candidate versus voting
against him. There are typically two major sources of information to a voter: first, via her own
neighbors in the (online/offline) social network, and second via the public broadcasting media – print
or electronic. Secondly, our connection model was following the stochastic block model that only
depends on the voters’ preferences and had no dependence on the voters’ geographical locations.
In this section, we relax these two simplifying assumptions and from an empirical viewpoint try to
see if the broad theoretical predictions hold.
We instantiate the voting population with a real election dataset. We construct the social
network of voters depending on their preferences and geographical locations to make the network
more realistic. We capture a voter v’s estimates of the population of different classes by taking
a weighted average of (1) voter v’s individual observation, i.e., the number of voters of different
classes in v’s immediate neighborhood and (2) a noisy version of the global (true) number of voters
in each class. Effects (1) and (2) capture a voter’s private and public observations respectively and
give a realistic view of opinion forming.
Datasets: We use the UK election dataset of EU referendum (popularly known as Brexit)2. The
dataset is publicly available and gives the total count of votes cast by the UK voters that voted
either ‘remain’ (R) or ‘leave’ (L) the EU. The data consists of approximately 33 million valid votes
and is partitioned across 382 regions within the UK. Each region is identified with the name of
the town, city, or county. We will refer to this dataset as Brexit dataset. We have used another
dataset3 to find the latitude and longitude of these regions. Since the location dataset gives the
latitude-longitude of a town and the voting constituencies are collection of a number of them, we
have averaged over the towns in a region to find the approximate centroid of the region. There
were few locations (about 18%) whose information were not available in the location dataset, we
have filled in their location to be the centroid of all the available locations in the dataset. The
Brexit data are suitable for our experiment, since (a) it has only two candidates for which we have
a simple yet insightful theoretical result (Theorem 2), (b) it is large enough to draw conclusions on
large-scale elections, and (c) the election was closely contested, (51.9% for L and 48.1% for R).
Approach: In each location, based on the total number of voters and their votes, we re-created the
voters. The connection follows a random graph model where the probability of connection between
two voters is the average of (a) p1, which is decreasing in the geographical distance between the
voters, and (b) p2, which is p if both voters are from the same class, and q, otherwise (with p > q).
This relaxation from the theoretical model allows for a social connection where two individuals are
geographically close despite having different political opinions.
In this social network, voters perceive the outcome of the election according to effects (1) and
(2) as explained before. For the individual observation (effect 1), we assume that a voter can
perfectly observe the true voting preferences of her immediate neighbors in the graph. The number
of voters that voted R or L in the immediate neighborhood gives a distribution of the R and L
voters in the neighborhood including herself. For the global observation (effect 2), we add a zero
2https://goo.gl/MtTdIT
3https://www.townslist.co.uk/
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Figure 1: Surprise in Brexit for different intra and inter-class connection probabilities (legends same
as Figure 1a).
mean truncated Gaussian noise to the true distribution of the votes – the truncated Gaussian is
set such that after the addition of noise, the resulting noisy distribution still remains a valid one,
i.e., no probability mass goes negative. We call the variance of the truncated Gaussian the bias
of this observation. The voter combines these two distributions with weights wI for the noise-free
individual distribution and wG for the noisy global distribution. Her perceived winner is the one
that has larger mass among the two outcomes in the weighted sum distribution.
Due to the massive scale of the dataset, which takes significant time to run a single experiment,
we have sampled 10, 000 votes uniformly at random and created a sub-election. In this sub-election,
every individual attempts to connect to 500 other individuals picked uniformly at random. In this
discussion, we consider the surprise of the voters in the minority class of this sub-election (i.e., the
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voters whose favorite candidate does not win – hence they get surprised when they perceive this
candidate to be the winner).
Results: We have three independent parameters that give rise to surprise: (1) the weight on global
observation wG (wI is fixed given this), (2) the bias on this observation, and (3) the choices of p
and q. To show how these parameters affect surprise, we plot the fraction of surprised minority
population versus wG for different choices of observation bias of the global distribution. Figure 1a
shows such a plot for a specific choice of p and q. Figures 1a to 1c show similar information when
p/q increases.
Observations. Some results support our theoretical predictions, even after relaxing our assump-
tions on network formation and voter estimates. (i) When the ratio p/q is large, the surprises are
large too. A large p22/p21 implies that more pˆ22, pˆ21 satisfies the condition of surprise in part 2 of
Theorem 2 (here p22 = p, p21 = q) – giving rise to a higher surprise. (ii) More bias in the observation
leads to a higher surprise (note, e.g., the wG = 1.0 point in Figure 1a). This too is expected by
Theorem 2 as a larger bias gives rise to a larger chance that the estimated ratio of p and q will be
different from p/q – thereby making the condition of surprise in part 2 of Theorem 2 gets satisfied
more likely.
However, there are a few observations that we find surprising. The downward trend of the
curve was expected with more weight on global information – but when there is noise in the global
information, there is an increase and dip in the surprise. Also, each curve shows a cross-over region,
where mixing a more noisy global observation gives a lower surprise.
6 Discussion
Our results give a quantitative understanding of surprise in elections. We set up a model for
voters’ preference generation, social network creation, and voters’ perception of the winner from
their local neighborhood. Our results for more than two candidates hint that possibly no single
voting rule can reduce the surprise for all sections of the voters. The empirical results complement
our assumption on voter’s estimates of connection probabilities. However, a more fine-grained
model of voter perception will help better understand the surprise phenomenon. We believe that a
thorough understanding of surprise is essential for mitigating it – particularly when such surprises
affect the social, economic, and political decisions of individuals.
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